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s protectors of the safety and soundness of
the banking system, banking supervisors
are responsible for keeping banks’ risk tak-
ing in check. On-site examinations, off-site
surveillance, and capital requirements are some of the tools
that supervisors use to achieve this goal. Franchise value—
the present value of the stream of profits that a firm is
expected to earn as a going concern—makes the supervi-
sor’s job easier by reducing banks’ incentives to take risk.
In banking, sources of franchise value include efficiency,
access to markets protected from competition, and valuable
lending relationships. Franchise value can help reduce
excessive risk taking because banks with high franchise
value have much to lose if a risky business strategy leads to
insolvency.
Economists studying the relationship between
franchise value and risk have noted some interesting pat-
terns over time. Most notably, Keeley (1990) documents
declines in bank franchise value during the 1950s, 1960s,
and 1970s, when the banking industry was experiencing
deregulation and increased competition from nonbank
financial institutions. He argues that this drop in franchise
value led to increased risk taking in the 1980s, a decade in
which the average failure rate for U.S. banks reached a
fifty-year high of almost 100 per year.
In this article, we explore the relationship between
franchise value and risk taking over the 1986-94 period.
We extend Keeley’s empirical analysis by estimating the
effect of franchise value on a variety of measures of bank
risk. We find an inverse relationship between franchise
value and an “all-in” measure of risk based on stock-return
volatility, which incorporates the risks of a bank’s asset, lia-
bility, and off-balance-sheet positions as well as its lever-
age. We also use information from the balance sheet to
determine how high-franchise-value banks reduce risk. We
find that banks with more franchise value hold more capi-
tal and have less asset risk than banks with less franchise
value. Though their tendency to hold risky loans is similar
to that of other banks, banks with high franchise value
maintain better diversified loan portfolios.
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FRANCHISE VALUE AND RISK TAKING
IN BANKING
We define franchise value as the present value of the future
profits that a firm is expected to earn as a going concern.
Profits are those gains beyond what is required to cover all
costs, including the cost of capital. Most firms in competi-
tive environments cannot generate stable profits because
competition tends to force them to lower their prices to
levels just high enough to cover all costs. However, firms
with access to superior technologies, such as new produc-
tion processes, or scarce factors of production, such as tal-
ented managers, may have franchise value.
In banking, franchise value arises from two main
sources. First, competition has been limited by regulations,
giving banks greater access to profits. We term franchise
value stemming from these restrictions “market-related,”
since differences in such franchise value vary across geo-
graphic and product markets but not across banks operat-
ing in the same geographic and product markets.
Although market-related sources of franchise value were
important in the 1970s, more recently that importance has
diminished. Second, franchise value arises from what we
term “bank-related” sources, such as efficiency differences
and variations in the value of lending relationships. These
bank-related factors continue to be an important source of
franchise value today.
MARKET-RELATED SOURCES OF FRANCHISE VALUE
Before the 1970s, banks faced limits on geographic expan-
sion both within states and across state borders. The
Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956 prevented bank holding companies (BHCs) from
acquiring an out-of-state bank unless that bank’s state
explicitly permitted such acquisitions by statute. Since no
state allowed such acquisitions, holding companies were in
effect prohibited from operating across state lines. In addi-
tion, before 1970, about two-thirds of the states had laws
restricting intrastate branching.
Both restrictions effectively limited competition
within the banking industry, thereby providing banks with
a greater opportunity to build franchise value. This opportu-
nity varied across banking markets.1 For instance, banks
located in states permitting no branching faced less com-
petition than those located in states allowing limited
branching.
Competition among banks changed dramatically
from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, however, as most of
the restrictions on intrastate and interstate banking were
lifted. Between 1975 and 1992, two-thirds of the states
relaxed restrictions on intrastate branching. During the
1980s and early 1990s, every state but Hawaii entered into
a regional or national interstate banking arrangement
whereby bank holding companies could operate across state
lines by owning banks in more than one state. In Septem-
ber 1994, the Reigle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branch-
ing Efficiency Act became law, permitting nationwide
interstate banking and, with state approval, interstate
branching. These changes have significantly increased com-
petition within the banking industry and consequently
lowered franchise value at many banks.
Franchise value has also declined as a result of
innovation. Automated teller machines, introduced in the
1970s, increased competition by permitting banks to pen-
etrate local markets without building full-scale branches.
In the late 1970s, nonbank financial institutions such as
money market mutual funds began offering close substi-
tutes for bank products, further elevating competition and
eroding bank franchise value.
Moreover, by the mid-1980s, Regulation Q inter-
est rate ceilings were fully phased out. While this develop-
ment helped banks compete with other financial
intermediaries for savings, it increased competition within
the banking industry.2
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BANK-RELATED SOURCES OF FRANCHISE VALUE
Although regulatory and technological changes have eroded
market-related sources of franchise value, bank-related
sources remain important. For example, a bank’s branch
network can give it a competitive advantage in dealing with
customers who prefer the convenience of full-service bank-
ing at a local branch. In recent years, we have also seen
banks use the locational and marketing advantages of
branch networks to sell financial products such as mutual
funds and life insurance. Moreover, as in all businesses,
some banks are simply more efficient than others. The
better-managed ones derive franchise value from their abil-
ity to provide banking services less expensively than their
competitors. While the removal of barriers to geographic
expansion increased competition and reduced franchise
value at many banks, the better-managed banks may have
benefited from the opportunity to grow at the expense of
their poorly managed rivals (Jayaratne and Strahan 1996).
Banks’ unique relationships with many of their
borrowers may also generate franchise value. Banks typi-
cally establish long-term relationships that allow them to
gain private information on the characteristics and credit
risks of their borrowers—information not readily available
to other bank or nonbank lenders (Berger and Udell 1995;
Petersen and Rajan 1995). These relationships reduce the
cost of loan origination, making lending more profitable.
Lending relationships continue to be an important source
of franchise value. 
HOW DOES FRANCHISE VALUE AFFECT 
BANK BEHAVIOR?
Firms that succeed in building franchise value will seek to
preserve it. Consequently, firms with large amounts of fran-
chise value may be predisposed to operate more safely than
those with little or none. For instance, high-franchise-value
banks may be more likely to hold capital in excess of that
required by regulations, to limit their exposure to high-
risk borrowers, and to hold well-diversified loan portfolios.
In using derivatives, they may also be more likely to hedge
against losses stemming from changes in interest rates and
foreign exchange rates than to speculate. These strategies
minimize the likelihood that such banks will lose their
franchise value through insolvency.
Franchise value plays a particularly important role
in banking because it helps mitigate the “moral hazard
problem” associated with the federal safety net. The safety
net, composed of the Federal Reserve’s discount window,
federal deposit insurance, and extensive supervision and
regulation of banks, helps ensure the soundness of the
banking system. However, this protection does not come
without cost. The safety net creates a moral hazard prob-
lem by insulating bank creditors from losses, thereby lim-
iting their incentive to restrain risk taking. Insured
depositors have little motivation to keep risk in check by
demanding interest rates commensurate with bank risk or
by withdrawing deposits when banks become riskier. Fran-
chise value can help lessen the moral hazard problem by
increasing banks’ incentives to operate safely, thereby
aligning their interests with those of the deposit insurer
and bank supervisor.3
An example may clarify the point. Consider the
incentives facing the imaginary FirstRisk Bank, which has
little capital and little or no franchise value. Its owners
may decide to make high-risk loans to a high-tech start-
up, knowing that if the loans are repaid, the bank will earn
hefty profits.4 If the loans default and the bank finds itself
insolvent, the owners will have lost very little. (Insured
depositors would have little reason to discipline FirstRisk
Bank because the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
guarantees their deposits.)
Suppose that FirstRisk Bank gets lucky. The high-
tech start-up with which it has developed a strong lending
relationship develops into the industry leader. The firm
becomes very profitable, and FirstRisk Bank becomes profit-
Banks’ unique relationships with many of their 
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able as a result of the lending relationship it has forged. Now
FirstRisk Bank has high franchise value, since as a going con-
cern it can expect strong future profits. With franchise value
to lose, FirstRisk’s owners are likely to rethink their aggres-
sive lending strategy. They will probably avoid further risky
lending. Moreover, they will have both the incentive and the
ability to raise the bank’s capital-to-assets ratio, further low-
ering the likelihood of losing the valuable lending relation-
ship through insolvency.
Note that the cost of failure—as well as FirstRisk’s
incentive to avoid it—is particularly high if FirstRisk’s
profitable lending relationship cannot be transferred easily
to another lending institution. In general, nontransferable
franchise value increases the cost of bank failures not just to
owners but also to borrowers, who may have difficulty
establishing new lending relationships with other banks.
To preserve the franchise value of a failed bank, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation typically searches for a
buyer willing to assume the bank’s assets and liabilities in
their entirety through a purchase-and-assumption transac-
tion.5 When lending relationships are longstanding, how-
ever, even such a transaction is unlikely to preserve the full
franchise value of the failed bank.
FRANCHISE VALUE AND BANK CAPITAL
Franchise value is not the only force mitigating moral hazard
in banking. Uninsured creditors have an incentive to moni-
tor risk taking and to demand returns commensurate with
bank risk. Bank supervisors also monitor risk taking
through on-site examinations and off-site surveillance and
discipline risk taking by enforcing certain rules of operation.
Perhaps the most important of these rules of oper-
ation are those dictating the maintenance of minimum
capital ratios. Should a risky strategy result in insolvency,
bank owners would lose their capital along with any fran-
chise value. By requiring banks to meet capital standards,
these regulations give bank owners an additional incentive
to avoid excessively risky behavior.
While a bank’s capital position and its franchise
value can each discourage risk taking, franchise value may
more consistently align the incentives of the bank owner
with those of the supervisor. A bank’s capital position
tends to vary over time in response to changes in loan
demand, interest rates, and general economic conditions.
In contrast, characteristics that generate franchise value,
particularly those related to efficiency, are more stable. For
instance, a bank with high franchise value stemming from
its ability to operate as a low-cost provider will have access
to profits even under poor economic conditions. This bank
will have a strong incentive to avoid excessive risk taking
throughout the business cycle.
When capital and franchise value are both
adversely affected at a large number of institutions, the
ramifications can be severe. The thrift crisis of the 1980s
provides a good example. Thrift franchise value fell for
many of the same reasons that franchise value fell in bank-
ing and because the development of secondary markets in
mortgage securities reduced thrifts’ ability to earn profits
from mortgage lending. Moreover, unlike banks, thrifts
faced a very large reduction in capital in the late 1970s and
early 1980s because the value of their mortgage portfolios,
which dominate thrift balance sheets, fell sharply in
response to increased interest rates. Since the thrifts had
lost much of their franchise value, owners had little incen-
tive to rebuild their capital positions. Instead, many used
fully insured deposits to increase their holdings of high-
risk assets such as junk bonds and commercial real estate.
This risky behavior led to a large number of thrift failures
and ultimately to the taxpayer bailout of the thrift insur-
ance fund.
In contrast, increases in franchise value should
lead banks to strengthen their capital positions voluntarily.
In our earlier example, we expected FirstRisk Bank to
increase its capital-to-assets ratio to reduce insolvency risk
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after franchise value rose. The bank could increase the ratio
through stock sales, changes in dividend policies, or
changes in the size of the balance sheet.
As we have seen, banks with high franchise value
have an incentive to reduce risky behavior and strengthen
their capital positions. Consequently, we expect risk at
banks to be negatively related to franchise value. We look
for evidence of this pattern in Chart 1, which reports the
average riskiness of bank holding companies with high and
low franchise value for 1986-94. We see that low-
franchise-value BHCs are consistently riskier than their
high-franchise-value counterparts, except in 1989, when
the risk of the two groups is similar. This pattern is consis-
tent with our expectations, but the analysis does not con-
trol for other factors that may affect risk.
QUANTIFYING THE FRANCHISE VALUE/RISK 
RELATIONSHIP
We now use a series of regressions to confirm that low-
franchise-value BHCs operate with greater risk.6 This
approach also allows us to quantify the strength of the rela-
tionship between franchise value and risk.
Each of our regressions has one of seven measures
of risk as its dependent variable. The independent variables
include franchise value and two controls: asset size and the
growth of personal income in the states where the BHC
operates.7 Asset size affects risk in two potentially offset-
ting ways. On the one hand, larger BHCs tend to be better
diversified and hence less vulnerable to economic shocks.
On the other hand, larger BHCs typically engage in riskier
activities. For instance, larger BHCs generally have a larger
share of their loan portfolios in relatively risky commercial
and industrial loans and a smaller share in relatively safe
mortgage loans. Growth in personal income is included to
control for regional business cycles that can affect risk at all
banks in a given area. The results of our regressions tell us
whether differences in franchise value can explain differ-
ences in risk taking among BHCs of similar size in similar
economic environments.
The dependent variables in our seven regressions
are measured using natural logarithms. The log specifica-
tion allows the estimated effect of franchise value on risk to
diminish as franchise value grows and risk falls. We believe
this approach is appropriate because the threat of insol-
vency motivates banks to reduce risk and because the like-
lihood of insolvency is low for banks with sufficiently low
levels of risk. These banks have little incentive to reduce
risk further as franchise value rises.
We estimate each of our regressions using fixed-
effects and random-effects models. Because our data set fol-
lows a sample of BHCs over time, these models can be used
to control for time-invariant, BHC-specific factors that
may be related to risk taking but are not explicitly
included in our regressions. In a random-effects regression,
this is done by specifying a certain mathematical structure
to the regression residuals. In a fixed-effects regression, all
variables are calculated as deviations from their BHC
means, so that regression results are driven by BHC-
specific changes in the regression variables over time. 
The advantage of the random-effects model is that
cross-sectional differences in risk such as those illustrated in
Chart 1 are reflected in the regression coefficients. The
advantage of the fixed-effects model is that omitted BHC-
specific factors related to risk taking are less likely to bias the
regression coefficients. Our regressions also include time
fixed effects, that is, each regression controls for changes in
the average level of risk over the years in the sample period.
Chart 1
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Security Prices and consolidated financial statements of a sample of publicly 
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MEASURING FRANCHISE VALUE AND RISK
Recall that franchise value is defined as the present value of
a firm’s future profits—revenues in excess of all costs,
including the cost of capital. One way to quantify franchise
value is to look at the difference between a firm’s market
value and its replacement cost, where replacement cost is
the expense of rebuilding the firm today:
Franchise value (FV) = market value – replacement cost.
The difference between market value and replacement cost
will be large when franchise value is high, that is, when
there are profits associated with the firm as a going concern.
Unfortunately, neither market value nor replace-
ment cost can be measured directly. We approximate the
market value of a BHC’s assets by adding the market value
of its equity (shares of stock outstanding times price per
share) and the book value of its liabilities.8 When a BHC
purchases an asset for more than its book value, the differ-
ence between its book value and the purchase price is
accounted for on the purchaser’s books as goodwill.
Because this difference is a component of the purchaser’s
franchise value, we approximate the replacement cost of a
BHC’s assets using the book value of its assets minus good-
will. Finally, we divide franchise value by assets (net of
goodwill) to derive a scale-free measure:
 
           ,
where E is the market value of equity, L is the book value of
liabilities, and A is the book value of assets. Adding 1 and
simplifying gives a proxy (Q) for the well-known
“Tobin’s q”:
                           .
FV
A goodwill – () -----------------------------------
E L A goodwill – () – +
A goodwill – () ------------------------------------------------------ =
Q
EL +
A goodwill – () ----------------------------------- =
Following Keeley, we use this ratio to measure franchise
value in the empirical analysis that follows.9
The Q ratio has the advantage of permitting com-
parability across BHCs of different sizes. For instance, if
the market value of a BHC’s assets (measured by E + L) is
$520 million and the replacement cost of those assets
(measured by A – goodwill) is $500 million, franchise value
equals $20 million (4 percent of replacement cost) and Q
equals 1.04. For a BHC with franchise value of $20 million
and a replacement cost of $1 billion, Q equals 1.02, since
franchise value equals only 2 percent of replacement cost.
Note that measurement of Q requires information on the
market value of the firm. Franchise value may be difficult
to measure for firms without publicly traded stock.
In the first part of our analysis, we use risk mea-
sures that are also derived from stock market data. We start
by calculating an all-in measure of risk, designed to
encompass all of the BHC’s risk-taking activities, includ-
ing the riskiness of its assets and liabilities, its choice of
off-balance-sheet activities, and its chosen capital-to-assets
ratio. Our all-in risk measure is based on the variability of
BHC stock returns over time. In particular, we calculate
the standard deviation of weekly stock returns for a given
BHC in a given year. Since stock returns reflect changes in
the market’s perceptions of future profitability, a high stan-
dard deviation in the returns indicates that the expected
profits of a BHC are fluctuating rapidly—a sign that the
BHC is pursuing risky activities. We discuss additional
measures of risk below, including measures that separate
the BHC’s portfolio risk from its capital-to-assets ratio.
Together, portfolio risk and capital determine all-in risk.
DATA DESCRIPTION
Our analysis is based on a sample of more than 100 BHCs
with publicly traded stock. In 1993, they ranged in size
from $170 million to $231 billion in assets and together
held a little less than half of all U.S. banking assets. Our
data set spans the 1986-94 period. Because most of the
institutions in our sample operated in each of the years
included in the sample period, we have 938 BHC-year
observations.10 We obtain the information needed to cal-
culate franchise value and all-in risk from the Center for
One way to quantify franchise value is to look 
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Research in Security Prices data tapes and from regulatory
reports (Y-9C reports) that contain consolidated financial
statements for BHCs. Data used to calculate franchise
value are from the beginning of each calendar year in the
sample period. This timing helps ensure that any causal
relationship runs from franchise value to BHC risk and not
the other way around.
Summary statistics describing franchise value, all-
in risk, and the other variables used in our analysis appear
in Table 1. As the table indicates, considerable variability
in risk taking exists among the BHCs in our sample. The
annualized standard deviation of weekly stock returns aver-
ages 33 percent in our sample, but ranges from around
10 percent to slightly more than 180 percent. We describe
several additional measures of risk below.
Our measure of franchise value averages just over
1.00, at 1.02. On average, the market value of assets for
the BHCs in our sample exceeds the book value of assets
by 2 percent.11 The standard deviation of 0.03 reveals
some dispersion in franchise values, but most of the BHCs
in our sample have franchise values near the average. How-
ever, the minimum and maximum statistics tell us that the
franchise value distribution is somewhat skewed. BHCs
with franchise values below 1.00 tend to bunch up near
the average; however, one BHC’s market value of assets is
more than 20 percent larger than its book value of assets.
DOES FRANCHISE VALUE NEGATIVELY 
AFFECT RISK?
The results of our first regression, in which all-in risk is
regressed on franchise value, BHC size, and personal
income growth, confirm that BHCs with the highest fran-
chise value exhibit the lowest all-in risk (Table 2). The
coefficient associated with franchise value is negative in
both the random-effects and fixed-effects models. More-
over, the coefficient associated with franchise value is sta-
tistically significant, that is, we can be confident that
franchise value is negatively related to all-in risk.12
Our estimates indicate that the effects of franchise
value on risk are not just statistically reliable but also eco-
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Center for Research in Security Prices and consolidated financial statements of a sample of publicly traded BHCs.
Notes:  Pooled data are from 1986 to 1994.  There are a total of 938 observations.
a Loan portfolio concentration equals the sum of the squared shares of each loan category (real estate, consumer, commercial and industrial, and other).  
b Growth in personal income for each BHC is computed as the asset-weighted average of the growth in real personal income for each state in which the BHC has one or more 
commercial bank subsidiaries.
Table 1 
BANK HOLDING COMPANY SUMMARY STATISTICS
Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
All-in risk (annualized standard
  deviation of weekly stock  
  returns) 0.33 0.19 0.10 1.81
Systematic risk 0.21 0.10 0.02 0.92
Firm-specific risk 0.25 0.17 0.08 1.56
Capital-to-assets ratio 0.06 0.01 -0.03 0.11
Loans-to-assets ratio 0.61 0.11 0.12  0.87
Commercial and industrial 
  loans-to-assets ratio 0.18  0.07 0.005 0.40
Loan portfolio concentrationa 0.33 0.06 0.25 0.68
Franchise value (market-to-book 
  asset ratio) 1.02 0.03 0.96 1.22
Total assets (billions of dollars) 18.92l 30.64lx 0.17 230.64
Growth in personal income 
  (percent)b    
2.05 2.03 -7.08 7.97
The results of our first regression . . . confirm 
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nomically meaningful. A 1 percentage point increase in
franchise value leads to a decrease in all-in risk of about
3.6 percent. This means that, on average, all-in risk at a
BHC with high franchise value (equal, for example, to
5 percent of assets) would be about 18 percent lower than
at a similar BHC with no franchise value.
Both asset size and personal income growth are
negatively related to all-in risk, though only the coefficient
on personal income growth in the random-effects specifica-
tion is statistically significant. Strong economic conditions
reduce variability in the stock returns of the BHCs in our
sample when we control for the other variables in the
regression.
FRANCHISE VALUE AND THE MIX OF BHC RISKS
We now introduce two new measures of BHC risk (Table 3).
They are derived by splitting our all-in risk measure into
two components: systematic risk, which reflects risks stem-
ming from underlying economic factors that affect the
banking industry as a whole (such as interest rate risk), and
firm-specific risk, which reflects risks unique to particular
banks (such as the industry mix of loans in a commercial
and industrial loan portfolio). Systematic risk is derived by
measuring the extent to which each BHC’s stock return
tracks those of a large sample of BHCs. Firm-specific risk is
derived from the difference between all-in risk and system-
atic risk.13 
Our earlier discussion suggests that BHCs would
like to reduce risks across the board as franchise value rises.
But it may be harder for BHCs to reduce certain kinds of
risks than others. For instance, a BHC that specializes in
lending to a particular industry may find it difficult to
diversify into new industries. As a result, the firm-specific
component of all-in risk may be less sensitive to changes in
franchise value than the systematic component.
A second line of reasoning suggests that systematic
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices and consolidated financial statements of a sample of publicly 
traded BHCs.
Notes: Table presents the coefficients from regressions of the log of all-in risk 
(annualized standard deviation of weekly stock returns) on franchise value 
(market-to-book asset ratio), size (log of total assets), and growth in personal 
income.  Regressions include time fixed effects (not shown).  Standard errors are 
in parentheses.  Pooled data are from 1986 to 1994.  There are a total of 938 
observations. 
a Growth in personal income for each BHC is computed as the asset-weighted 
average of the growth in real personal income for each state in which the BHC 
has one or more commercial bank subsidiaries.
b The reported R-squared in the fixed-effects model corresponds to a regression in 
which all variables are calculated as deviations from their BHC means. 
* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Table 2 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALL-IN RISK 
AND FRANCHISE VALUE
 All-In  Risk
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R-squared 0.328  l 0.402b
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices and consolidated financial statements of a sample of publicly 
traded BHCs.
Notes: Table presents the coefficients from regressions of the logs of systematic 
risk and firm-specific risk on franchise value (market-to-book asset ratio), size (log 
of total assets), and growth in personal income.  Regressions include time fixed 
effects (not shown).  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Pooled data are from 
1986 to 1994.  There are a total of 938 observations. 
a Growth in personal income for each BHC is computed as the asset-weighted 
average of the growth in real personal income for each state in which the BHC has 
one or more commercial bank subsidiaries.
b The reported R-squared in the fixed-effects models corresponds to a regression 
in which all variables are calculated as deviations from their BHC means. 
* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 3
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RISK COMPONENTS 
AND FRANCHISE VALUE
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risk may be less sensitive to changes in franchise value.
Franchise value should mitigate risk taking because BHC
owners fear that they will lose the value of their franchise
through insolvency. However, if a BHC faces severe finan-
cial difficulties at the same time as many other BHCs, it
may be more likely to receive assistance from the govern-
ment, since one of the primary goals of the federal safety
net is to stabilize the financial system during times of
crisis. Consequently, BHCs may have little incentive to
lower systematic risk, even when franchise value is high.
Empirically, we find that franchise value has a sim-
ilar negative effect on systematic and firm-specific risk
(Table 3). A 1 percentage point increase in franchise value
leads to a decline of roughly 3 percent in firm-specific and
systematic risk. Perhaps BHCs can adjust these two types of
risk with similar ease. Alternatively, any difficulties associ-
ated with reducing firm-specific risk may simply be coun-
terbalanced by weaker incentives to reduce systematic risk.
The relationship between personal income growth
and BHC risk, particularly in the firm-specific risk regres-
sion, also proves to be negative (Table 3). Asset size, which
was insignificant in Table 2, is negatively related to firm-
specific risk but positively related to systematic risk in the
random-effects model. This apparent inconsistency can be
reconciled by noting that larger BHCs are generally better
diversified than smaller ones but have lower capital-to-
assets ratios and engage more intensively in certain risky
activities. The negative influence of size in the firm-specific
risk regression reflects the better diversification of larger
BHCs. The positive influence of size in the systematic risk
regression reflects differences in the mix of activities pur-
sued by small and large BHCs. The two effects are approx-
imately offsetting, leaving little relationship between BHC
size and all-in risk.14 
Overall, our empirical tests strongly support the
hypothesized negative relationship between franchise value
and risk. Analyses using measures of risk derived from
BHCs’ stock returns suggest that BHCs with strong profit
potential, and hence with much to lose in the event of
insolvency, display lower systematic risk, lower firm-specific
risk, and lower overall risk. Using results reported in
Tables 2 and 3, we plot the predicted level of risk against
franchise value for a typical BHC in Chart 2. All three market-
based measures of BHC risk fall as franchise value rises.
HOW DO HIGH-FRANCHISE-VALUE BANKS 
REDUCE RISK?
Recall our example of FirstRisk Bank, which seeks to reduce
its insolvency risk as its franchise value rises. FirstRisk can do
so in a variety of ways. It can boost its capital-to-assets
ratio by retaining earnings or issuing new equity, or it can
reduce portfolio risk by steering clear of risky loans or fur-
ther diversifying its loan portfolio. We now determine
which type of behavior—strengthening capital, reducing
portfolio risk, or both—underlies the relationship between
franchise value and risk for the BHCs in our sample.
We use two approaches to explore this issue. First,
we estimate regressions using the capital-to-assets ratio
and three measures of portfolio risk derived from the bal-
ance sheet as dependent variables. Independent variables
are the same as those used above (franchise value, BHC
size, and state-level personal income growth). The results
suggest that high-franchise-value BHCs have lower all-in
risk because they have stronger capital positions and safer
Chart 2
Predicted risk (standard deviation of stock return)











Source:  Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices and consolidated financial statements of a sample of publicly 
traded BHCs.
Note:  The underlying calculations are based on coefficients from the random-
effects models and sample means for the log of total assets (15.96) and growth 




0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20 1.25
Q (Market-to-book asset ratio)10 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1996
portfolios. However, since no all-encompassing measure of
portfolio risk is available from the balance sheet, this
approach does not allow us to quantify the effect of fran-
chise value on overall portfolio risk.
In our second approach, we go back to using stock-
return variability to measure risk, but we include the loga-
rithm of the capital-to-assets ratio as an additional indepen-
dent variable. This approach allows us to control for the
effect of leverage on stock-return variability when estimat-
ing the effect of franchise value. Because capital (like portfo-
lio risk) is chosen by the BHC, we are more comfortable
estimating a regression with capital as a dependent variable
(as in our first approach). Nevertheless, adding capital to
the right-hand side of regressions with all-in risk, system-
atic risk, or firm-specific risk as dependent variables helps
us determine whether franchise value has an effect on risk
taking above and beyond its effect on capital. In other
words, these regressions enable us to obtain an estimate of
the effect of franchise value on overall portfolio risk.15
The results of our first approach are reported in
Table 4. We look for evidence that high-franchise-value
BHCs reduce risk by: (1) increasing their capital-to-assets
ratios, (2) shifting from loans in general to safer assets,
(3) shifting from relatively high-risk commercial and
industrial loans to less risky loans and other assets, and
(4) decreasing loan portfolio concentration. We measure
loan portfolio concentration by squaring and summing the
shares of the loan portfolio in each of four loan groups:
commercial and industrial, real estate, consumer, and other
loans. The resulting concentration index ranges from zero
to one, taking on higher values for portfolios concentrated
in one or two of these four loan groups. Information on
loans, assets, and capital was obtained from BHCs’ Y-9C
reports.16 
[Our] results suggest that high-franchise-value 
BHCs have lower all-in risk because they have 
stronger capital positions and safer portfolios.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Center for Research in Security Prices and consolidated financial statements of a sample of publicly traded BHCs.
Notes: Table presents the coefficients from regressions of the logs of the capital-to-assets ratio, the loans-to-assets ratio, the commercial and industrial loans-to-assets ratio, 
and loan portfolio concentration on franchise value (market-to-book asset ratio), size (log of total assets), and growth in personal income.  Regressions include time fixed 
effects (not shown).  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Pooled data are from 1986 to 1994.  There are a total of 938 observations. Regressions including the capital-to-
assets ratio have 936 observations because capital is negative for two observations.
a Loan portfolio concentration equals the sum of the squared shares of each loan category (real estate, consumer, commercial and industrial, and other).
b Growth in personal income for each BHC is computed as the asset-weighted average of the growth in real personal income for each state in which the BHC has one or 
more commercial bank subsidiaries.
c The reported R-squared in the fixed-effects models corresponds to a regression in which all variables are calculated as deviations from their BHC means.
* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 4
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BALANCE-SHEET RISK AND FRANCHISE VALUE
Capital-to-Assets Ratio Loans-to-Assets Ratio
Commercial and Industrial 
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We find strong evidence that BHCs with high
franchise value reduce risk by increasing their capital-to-
assets ratios and by decreasing loan portfolio concentration.
The franchise value coefficient in the capital regression is
positive and highly significant, and the coefficient in the
loan portfolio concentration regression is negative and
highly significant. In contrast, we find no evidence that
high-franchise-value BHCs shift from lending in general
or from commercial and industrial lending in particular to
safer assets, suggesting that it is costly for BHCs to adjust
their lending behavior in response to changes in franchise
value. It is possible, however, that the regression coeffi-
cients underestimate the effect of franchise value on lend-
ing. Since franchise value stems in part from lending
relationships, BHCs that devote a greater share of their
assets to lending may have higher franchise value, all else
equal. This effect may counteract any negative influence of
franchise value on the loans-to-assets ratio.
The results of our second approach are reported in
Table 5. All-in risk, systematic risk, and firm-specific risk
are each regressed on franchise value, BHC size, personal
income growth, and the logarithm of the capital-to-assets
ratio, included to control for the effect of leverage. The
franchise value coefficients in Table 5 are smaller than
those in Tables 2 and 3, but in all three regressions we con-
tinue to find a negative and significant coefficient on fran-
chise value. Together, Tables 4 and 5 show that BHCs with
higher franchise value have lower risk because they have
stronger capital positions and safer portfolios.
CONCLUSION
We have argued that franchise value helps offset the incen-
tive for firms to increase risk because firms with the ability
to generate profits will act to protect their valuable fran-
chise. The discipline introduced by franchise value is par-
ticularly important in the banking industry, where the
federal safety net insulates banks from costs normally borne
by risky firms.
Our empirical results support the theory that
banks that are more efficient, are located in less competi-
tive markets, or have valuable lending relationships oper-
ate more safely. We find that high-franchise-value banks
hold more capital and take on less portfolio risk, leading to
lower levels of overall risk. We also observe a negative rela-
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Center for Research in Security Prices and consolidated financial statements of a sample of publicly traded BHCs.
Notes: Table presents the coefficients from regressions of the logs of all-in risk, systematic risk, and firm-specific risk on franchise value (market-to-book asset ratio), size 
(log of total assets), growth in personal income, and log of the capital-to-assets ratio.  Regressions include time fixed effects (not shown).  Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Pooled data are from 1986 to 1994.  There are a total of 936 observations. 
a Growth in personal income for each BHC is computed as the asset-weighted average of the growth in real personal income for each state in which the BHC has one or 
more commercial bank subsidiaries.
b The reported R-squared in the fixed-effects models corresponds to a regression in which all variables are calculated as deviations from their BHC means. 
* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 5
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RISK AND FRANCHISE VALUE CONTROLLING FOR CAPITAL
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tionship between franchise value and systematic risk (the
risk related to factors that affect the banking industry as a
whole) and between franchise value and firm-specific risk
(the risk unique to individual institutions). 
Our results do not suggest a specific supervisory
approach; however, they highlight the importance of con-
tinued monitoring of franchise value in the banking indus-
try. When franchise value is high, banks are less inclined to
take excessive risk, reducing the potential for conflicts
between banks and their supervisors. This behavior holds
even during periods of economic distress, when capital may
be low. In contrast, the interests of banks may conflict with
those of supervisors when franchise value is low, especially
during periods of economic distress. As the thrift crisis of
the 1980s demonstrated, institutions with low capital and
low franchise value may have a strong incentive to increase
risk and “go for broke.”ENDNOTES
NOTES FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1996 13
1. Some analysts apply the term “charter value” to these market-related
sources of franchise value in banking. The term reflects the fact that
investors would be willing to pay a significant amount for the right to
open a bank in markets protected from competition.
2. See Edwards and Mishkin (1995) for a more complete discussion of
changes in banking since the mid-1970s.
3. Marcus (1984), Keeley (1990), and Acharya (1996) show formally how
franchise value can mitigate moral hazard problems in banking.
4. We do not consider agency problems that may cause the incentives of
managers and owners to diverge. Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan
(1996) show that the effect of franchise value on risk remains important
even after controlling for managers’ ownership share.
5. Acharya (1996) shows that closing an insolvent bank with large
amounts of franchise value can be less than optimal since much of its
franchise value would be lost.
6. Our regressions are similar in structure to those estimated by Keeley,
though our measures of BHC risk differ from those that Keeley analyzes,
and he works with data from an earlier period. He uses two measures of
risk: the interest rate paid on large certificates of deposit and the market-
value capital-to-assets ratio. Keeley also estimates a somewhat more
complicated system of equations than the one estimated here.
7. Since many of the BHCs in our sample operate in more than one state,
we measure growth in personal income using the asset-weighted average
of real personal income growth across states in which a BHC has one or
more commercial bank subsidiaries.
8. Since we do not observe the market value of liabilities, our measure of
franchise value will include the subsidy associated with deposit
insurance, which increases with risk taking. Since we seek evidence of an
inverse relationship between franchise value and risk taking, this
complication makes it more difficult for us to find empirical support for
the hypothesis we test.
9. An alternative measure of franchise value is the market-to-book equity
ratio, which is highly correlated with the market-to-book asset ratio used
here. Our empirical results are not sensitive to the use of this alternative
measure of franchise value.
10. The BHCs in our data set were identified using the Bank Compustat
data base. We worked with only those BHCs for which we could retrieve
both stock-return data and data from regulatory reports and whose stock
traded for at least thirty weeks in a given calendar year. BHCs acquired
in the middle of our sample period were dropped from the sample after
the date of acquisition. BHCs that acquired other firms during the
sample period remained in the sample. The results presented below are
qualitatively similar when we limit our analysis to BHCs that operated
throughout the 1986-94 period.
11. The average value of 1.02 is statistically significantly different from
1.00.
12. Studies show that banks in protected markets operate more safely
(Rhoades and Rutz 1982) and less efficiently (Berger and Hannan 1994).
Initially, this behavior may induce a negative relationship between
franchise value and risk since diminished competition can enhance
franchise value. Over time, however, inefficient behavior will lead
franchise value to decline. We tried controlling for market concentration
when empirically examining the relationship between franchise value
and risk and found that market concentration could not explain the
negative franchise value/risk relationship that we observe.
13. We estimate a five-factor return-generating model using factor
analysis, which solves for the five vectors and weights that best explain
the component of returns common to the BHCs in our sample.
Systematic risk is the square root of the portion of total return variance
that can be explained by these five factors. Firm-specific risk is the square
root of the difference between total return variance and the square of
systematic risk. See Demsetz and Strahan (1995) for additional details on
the construction of firm-specific and systematic risk in this sample.
14. See Demsetz and Strahan (forthcoming) for further analysis of the
relationship between diversification, size, and risk at BHCs. 
15. Another way to measure the relationship between franchise value and
portfolio risk is to remove the effect of leverage from stock-return
variability and use the resulting “deleveraged” risk measure as a
dependent variable.  We tried making this adjustment by multiplying
all-in risk, systematic risk, and firm-specific risk by the capital-to-assets
ratio and taking the log of each product.  Using the resulting risk
measures as dependent variables, we continued to find negative and
significant coefficients on franchise value, suggesting a negative
relationship between franchise value and portfolio risk.  In fact, these
coefficients were similar in magnitude to those reported in Table 5.
16. Loans, assets, and capital are measured at the same point in time as
franchise value.14 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1996 NOTES
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